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1 Introduction 
For many services, such as telecommunication or 
online information, consumers can choose between 
a wide spectrum of optional pricing plans, including 
flat rates, pay-per-use tariffs, or two- and three-part 
tariffs. Because consumers’ tariff choice affects their 
usage, the billing rate, and the company’s profits, 
setting optimal prices is of great importance. Yet 
companies often experiment with different pricing 
schemes at great cost rather than make sound evi-
dence-based decisions supported by market re-
search (Essegaier, Gupta, and Zhang 2002; Schler-
eth, Stepanchuk, and Skiera 2010). 
Standard economic theory assumes that a consumer 
chooses a tariff that minimizes the billing rate given 
his expected usage (Brown and Sibley 1986). How-
ever, empirical studies suggest that consumers base 
their tariff choices not only on the expected billing 
rate but also on tariff-specific preferences. For ex-
ample, consumers may prefer a flat-rate tariff to 
usage-based pricing (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; 
Nunes 2000; Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 
1987). If tariff-specific preferences influence a con-
sumer’s tariff choice, such preferences should also 
affect his price sensitivity. However, most studies on 
tariff choice neglect the influence of tariff-specific 
preferences on price responsiveness assuming that 
consumers are homogeneous in their price sensitiv-
ity (Kling and van der Ploeg 1990; Lambrecht, Seim, 
and Skiera 2007; Lee 1999; Train, McFadden, and 
Ben-Akiva 1987). This may prompt suboptimal 
pricing strategy recommendations (Gensch 1985).  
The aim of this paper is to analyze how tariff-spe-
cific preferences influence the responsiveness of 
consumers’ tariff choice and usage to price changes. 
In doing so, we aim to add to researchers’ and man-
agers’ understanding of consumers’ tariff choice and 
ultimately help to improve pricing decisions. We use 
attitudinal data to segment consumers by tariff-
specific preferences and then exploit usage data to 
analyze how those preferences influence price elas-
ticities - a common measure of price sensitivity 
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(Kaul and Wittink 1995). A key feature of our ap-
proach is that we combine actual usage data with 
attitudinal data of the same consumers. 
The paper is organized as follows: We first discuss 
related literature and introduce a conceptual model 
of the effect of tariff-specific preferences on tariff 
choice and usage. Next, we demonstrate how to 
empirically measure consumers’ tariff choice and 
usage decisions when accounting for tariff-specific 
preferences. We then present our empirical study 
and results. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our study. 
2 Literature review 
With a flat-rate tariff, consumers pay only an access 
price, whereas pay-per-use tariffs charge only a 
usage price. In a two-part tariff, consumers pay both 
an access price for obtaining access to the service 
and a usage price for the quantity used (Brown and 
Sibley 1986). In a three-part tariff, consumers ob-
tain a usage allowance for paying the access price, 
for example, free minutes on a cell-phone plan, and 
then pay a usage price only when their usage ex-
ceeds the allowance (Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera 
2007).  
It is often assumed that when choosing among me-
nus of those tariffs, consumers prefer the tariff that 
minimizes their billing rate, given their expected 
usage (Brown and Sibley 1986; Iyengar, Jedidi, and 
Kohli 2008). Yet, recent studies indicate that many 
consumers choose a tariff that does not minimize 
their billing rate, but are subject to a flat-rate bias: 
Those consumers select a flat-rate or a tariff with a 
higher allowance even though they would pay less 
on a tariff that charges for actual usage. Alterna-
tively, they may choose a tariff that charges for ac-
tual usage even though they would pay less on a flat 
rate (pay-per-use bias) (see among others Lam-
brecht and Skiera 2006; Miravete 2002; Nunes 
2000; Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987). 
These results suggest that, in addition to billing rate, 
choice of tariffs is also driven by consumers’ prefer-
ences for tariff-specific characteristics, such as a 
high allowance.  
Previous findings propose various effects to explain 
why consumers have a flat-rate bias. Since con-
sumption likely varies monthly, the billing rate un-
der a pay-pay-use tariff would also vary. Under a flat 
rate a consumer can avoid such variation in the 
monthly billing rate. Consequently, consumers who 
cannot predict their future consumption exactly, can 
choose a flat rate to insure against the risk of high 
costs in periods of higher-than-average usage; an 
effect dubbed as "insurance effect" (Miravete 2002; 
Train 1991; Winer 2005; Lambrecht and Skiera 
2006). In addition, consumers may enjoy their us-
age more on a flat rate than on a pay-per-use tariff 
(also called "taxi meter effect"). The reason is that 
paying per use may lessen the joy from consump-
tion, as the cost and thus the pain of paying are 
attributed to the consumption at the time of usage. 
In contrast, consumption is separated from pay-
ment under a flat rate as the costs are mentally pre-
paid, e.g., at the beginning of each month (Prelec 
and Loewenstein 1998).  
The pay-per-use bias has not been as prevalent as 
the flat-rate bias. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) 
show that the pay-per-use bias is both, less impor-
tant and less regular than the flat-rate bias. Simi-
larly its drivers were analyzed only to a limited ex-
tent. Train (1991) proposes risk aversion as a possi-
ble explanation for pay-per-use bias but provides no 
empirical support for this claim. The empirical re-
sult of Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) indicates that 
the pay-per-use bias is driven by the underestima-
tion of usage. 
In addition to factors that are tariff-specific, there 
also exist factors that may lead to both kinds of bi-
ases. Consumers may enjoy the convenience of not 
comparing various tariffs (called "convenience ef-
fect"). The convenience effect can lead to both flat-
rate bias and pay-per-use bias, which mainly de-
pends on which tariff is traditionally offered on the 
market and which tariff has been used before by the 
consumer. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) can, how-
ever, not confirm that the convenience effect leads 
to a bias. Other potential effects that may steer con-
sumers toward a suboptimal tariff include the un-
certainty about future demand when they make a 
tariff choice (Nunes 2000), including both usage 
overestimation and underestimation. Lambrecht 
and Skiera (2006) find empirical support for the 
notion that consumers suffer from making estima-
tion errors in both directions. Not surprisingly, 
overestimation leads to a flat-rate bias, whereas 
underestimation is a major cause of pay-per-use 
bias. These effects, however, result from consumers’ 
limited cognitive abilities and usage characteristics 
and as such do not reflect preferences for tariffs. 
Marketing research provides ample evidence that 
attitudes guide behavior (e.g., Fazio and Zanna 
1981). Consequently, we should also expect a con-
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sumer’s tariff-specific preferences driven by the 
effects described above to affect his price sensitivity 
with respect to tariff choice and usage. There is, 
however, little research on the effect of tariff-specific 
preferences on consumers’ price sensitivity. Below, 
we develop a framework that illustrates the effect of 
tariff-specific preferences on price sensitivity. 
3 Conceptual model 
3.1 Influence of tariff-specific preferences 
on price sensitivity with respect to tariff 
choice 
When selecting a tariff, its price and the expected 
billing rate are important but are not the only choice 
criteria for consumers who care about the tariff’s 
characteristics (e.g., the constant billing rate of a flat 
rate). Consumers with tariff-specific preferences 
may tend to choose their preferred tariff in spite of 
its higher price. Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Bur-
ton (1990) show that consumers often choose their 
favorite alternative even if it is more expensive. 
Consequently, we expect consumers with tariff pref-
erences to be less sensitive to a price increase of 
their preferred tariff than consumers whose choice 
is exclusively guided by the expected billing rate. On 
the other hand, consumers who dislike characteris-
tics of a given tariff, but still choose this tariff due to 
its low price, are likely to switch as soon as the price 
of this tariff increases and the only reason for choos-
ing it disappears. As a result, we expect these con-
sumers to be more responsive to price increases of 
the tariff they dislike.  
In line with previous findings we define three seg-
ments of consumers: (1) Consumers that have a 
preference for flat rates, (2) consumers whose 
choice is not affected by tariff-specific characteris-
tics and (3) consumers who dislike the characteris-
tics of flat rates, which we will refer to as a flat-rate 
aversion. We expect consumers who prefer flat-rate 
tariffs to be less sensitive to increases in the access 
price of flat-rate tariffs, and more generally less 
sensitive to increases in the access and usage price 
of tariffs that share similar characteristics with flat 
rates (e.g., three-part tariffs with high usage allow-
ances) than other consumers. Conversely, such con-
sumers should be more sensitive to increases in 
usage price of pay-per-use tariffs, and more gener-
ally more sensitive to increases in the access and 
usage price of tariffs that have none or only a small 
usage allowance. We anticipate the opposite effect 
for consumers with a flat-rate aversion. We conse-
quently expect price sensitivities to vary across seg-
ments as illustrated in Table 1. 
3.2 Influence of tariff-specific preferences 
on price sensitivity with respect to usage 
Companies aiming to set optimal prices need to 
understand how prices affect tariff choice as well as 
usage. Under optional tariffs, the usage price enters 
a demand function that is conditional on tariff 
choice (Brown and Sibley 1986; Train, McFadden, 
Table 1: Expected price elasticities across tariffs with respect to tariff choice 
Access price elasticity  
 
Usage price elasticity  




















Tariff 1  
Three-part tariff with 
low access price and 
allowance 
Low Middle High 
 
Low Middle High 
Tariff 2 
Three-part tariff with 
high access price and 
allowance 
Middle Middle Middle 
 
High Middle Low 
Tariff 3 Flat rate High Middle Low     
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and Ben-Akiva 1987). As a result, usage price influ-
ences demand directly as well as indirectly via its 
influence on tariff choice. The access price influ-
ences usage indirectly via its effect on tariff choice. 
We discuss the effect of access and usage price in 
turn. 
Access price 
The response to increasing the access price of a flat 
rate or a three-part tariff with a high allowance is 
consequently that consumers with a flat-rate aver-
sion are more likely than other consumers to switch 
down to a tariff with a lower access price, a lower 
usage allowance, or a higher usage price. Because 
these switchers face a higher marginal price, their 
expected usage is likely to decrease. In sum, an in-
crease of the access price of a tariff with a high ac-
cess price and allowance decreases usage of con-
sumers with a flat-rate aversion more than of con-
sumers with a flat-rate preference simply because 
the latter are less likely to switch tariffs.  
Further, if the company increases the access price of 
a tariff with a low usage allowance, consumers of 
that tariff are likely to switch up to a tariff with a 
higher allowance or lower usage price. Switchers 
thus face a lower marginal price, resulting in a high-
er expected usage. On average, the effect of an in-
crease in access price of a tariff with a low usage 
allowance on usage is strongest for consumers with 
a flat-rate preference as they are more likely to 
switch up to a tariff with a higher access price, a 
higher usage allowance or a lower usage price. This 
effect will be lowest for consumers with a flat-rate 
aversion. 
Usage price 
Determining the effect of changes in usage prices on 
usage is less obvious. An increase in the usage price 
reduces the usage of those consumers who stay on 
the same tariff. Yet, an increase in the usage price 
might also induce consumers to switch up to tariffs 
with a higher access price, a higher usage allowance 
or a lower usage price, which would consequently 
increase their usage (Train, McFadden, and Ben-
Akiva 1987). Therefore, two opposite effects are 
likely to take place as a result of usage price in-
crease. We expect a high negative effect of a price 
increase on usage for consumers that have a flat-
rate aversion because they are less likely to switch 
up to tariffs with higher allowances. On the other 
hand, consumers that have a flat-rate preference are 
more likely to switch up to a tariff with a higher 
access price or a higher allowance which will in-
crease their usage. Therefore, we expect a positive 
effect for them. Table 2 summarizes the effects. We 
next aim to empirically validate differences in price 
sensitivities across segments. 
4 Methodology 
Previous literature finds that two attitudinal effects 
influence tariff-specific preferences: the taxi meter 
and the insurance effect (Lambrecht and Skiera 
Table 2: Expected price elasticities across tariffs with respect to usage 
Access price elasticity  
 
Usage price elasticity  
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2006). We use the multi-item scales as in Lam-
brecht and Skiera (2006) to identify consumers with 
(1) a flat-rate preference, (2) a flat-rate aversion, and 
(3) tariff-indifference. Consumers that score 4 or 
higher on the 5-point Likert scale for either the taxi 
meter effect or the insurance effect, and as such 
agree or strongly agree to have a preference for a flat 
rate, are assigned to the flat-rate preference seg-
ment. Consumers who score 2 or lower on both 
scales are classified as the flat-rate aversion seg-
ment. The remaining consumers constitute the 
segment that is indifferent between tariff-specific 
characteristics. Thus, we group consumers based on 
their attitudes and then estimate a tariff choice 
model for each group. Such an approach is particu-
larly suitable for our study because the goal is to 
explore and understand differences between known 
groups. 
We use transactional data from an Internet provider 
to model consumers’ usage and tariff choice deci-
sions. In modeling tariff choice, researchers need to 
account for the interdependency between tariff 
choice and actual usage. A consumer with high us-
age typically chooses a flat rate while low usage of a 
consumer is related to a measured tariff. On the 
other hand, once a household chooses a specific 
tariff, its usage is likely to be affected by this choice. 
Theoretical and empirical research show that con-
sumers likely increase their usage having chosen a 
flat-rate tariff whereas a pay-per-use tariff makes 
them decrease their usage (Brown and Sibley 1986; 
Altmann and Chu 2001; Narayanan, Chintagunta, 
and Miravete 2007; Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta 
2007; Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera 2007). In order 
to account for those interdependencies between 
tariff choice and usage level we follow Train, 
McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Lee (1999) 
and estimate a nested logit model. We assume that 
consumer i chooses Internet usage amount (i.e., 
usage portfolio p) and then given the chosen usage 
portfolio p chooses tariff t. Such a direction reflects 
the fact that consumers use their expectations about 
the usage amount to make a tariff decision. This 
sequence of decisions has been tested in Train, Ben-
Akiva, and Atherton (1989) and applied in Train, 
McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987). Thus, the inter-
dependency is captured in such a way that the tariff 
choice is conditional on the usage portfolio choice. 
Additionally, when making a usage portfolio choice 
the utility of the tariffs available for this portfolio are 
taken into account in an inclusive value. This results 
























where Ppti is a probability that consumer i chooses 
usage portfolio p from a set of possible usage portfo-
lios P and tariff t from a set of possible tariffs T, Upti 
is consumer i’s utility of choosing usage portfolio p 
and tariff t. We can rewrite the probability Ppti as a 
product of the marginal probability that consumer i 
chooses the usage portfolio p, Ppi, and the condi-
tional probability that he chooses tariff t given usage 
portfolio p, Pt/pi, as follows: 
(2) 
pitpipti PPP /  
We further define in (3) the marginal probability Ppi 
that consumer i chooses usage portfolio p. Since the 
consumer can choose any Internet usage amount, 
the number of possible usage portfolios from which 
the consumer can choose quickly becomes im-
mense. Including all those portfolios in the prob-
ability function is, however, infeasible (Train, 
McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987; Train, Ben-Akiva, 
and Atherton 1989). Therefore, for each consumer i 
we create a sample of usage portfolios by drawing 
from the set of all portfolios that are pre-specified by 
the observed consumer usage pattern. As a result, 
for each consumer we obtain a set of sample portfo-
lios, Wi, which includes the consumer’s chosen port-
folio and a subset of nine other portfolios which are 
used in the probability specification (3). In order to 
correct for the bias introduced by the sampling of 
alternatives we include a correction term, 
ln(P(Wi/p)). This approach is similar to the one 
used in Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and 

















Each usage portfolio is defined by the number of 
logins to the Internet per month (N) and the average 
data volume transferred per login (V). Such a defini-
tion allows for capturing the distinctive characteris-
tics of the Internet usage pattern. The total data 
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volume transferred per month results from multi-
plying the number of logins and the average data 
volume per login. In the portfolio utility specifica-
tion, we recognize that the Internet usage provides 
both benefits and opportunity costs. The first term, 
NpiVpi, captures the total volume transferred in a 
month and represents the benefits of Internet usage 
that increase with the volume. Since the benefits 
increase with an increasing volume we expect to 
obtain a positive value for coefficient . According to 
the expected decreasing marginal utility of the bene-
fits, we use logarithmic values, i.e. ln(NpiVpi). Since 
every login to the Internet is time consuming, Npi 
represents the opportunity costs of time for every 
login to the Internet. Since the opportunity costs 
decrease the utility, Npi enters the utility specifica-
tion with a negative sign (as such we include a nega-
tive sign before coefficient ). Lastly, Ipi is the inclu-
sive value which represents the utility for consumer 










pTiTpi BI 21expln    
where Bpti indicates the consumers i’s billing rate for 
a given usage portfolio p under a given tariff t. As 
such, the choice of usage portfolio depends on the 
expected billing rate under all available tariffs. Coef-
ficient  indicates the substitutability across alterna-
tives. Values between 0 and 1 indicate higher 
switching within than among nests, which means 
that the consumer more likely changes tariffs than 
usage portfolios. If the coefficient is higher than 1, 
the consumer more likely changes his usage portfo-
lio than his tariff. 
The choice of the tariff depends on the tariff-specific 
constant and the consumer’s billing rate for this 
tariff, conditional on the choice of usage portfolio 
Bpti. The billing rate is calculated by multiplying the 
usage amount by the marginal price in case of 
measured options. In case of a flat rate, the billing 
rate constitutes a fixed fee. Consequently, we define 
consumer i’s conditional probability of choosing 



















Assuming rationally behaving consumers, we expect 
that the lower the billing rate under a given tariff, 
the higher the probability of choosing this tariff. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship be-
tween the billing rate and the tariff choice expressed 
in the negative coefficient 2.  
5 Data  
We use attitudinal and transactional data of con-
sumers of a German Internet service provider. The 
provider offered three different tariffs in 2003: (1) 
Tariff 1, a three-part tariff with a low access price 
and a low monthly allowance; (2) Tariff 2, a three-
part tariff with a higher access price and a higher 
allowance than Tariff 1 but the same usage price; 
and (3) Tariff 3, a flat rate with unlimited usage. The 
data includes the tariff choice and the monthly us-
age measured in megabytes for 11,745 customers 
over a time period of up to five months, a total of 
49,107 monthly usage observations. The prices for 
each tariff were constant in the observation period.  
Information about latent attitudes comes from an 
online survey conducted among a representative 
sample of customers of the Internet service pro-
vider. The survey consists of items that measure the 
taxi meter and insurance effects on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 - strongly disagree, 5 - strongly agree) 
(Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). From the sample of 
12,000 customers, we obtain 1,078 complete re-
sponses. For 941 consumers we match the transac-
tional data to the survey data which constitutes our 
final sample with 3,910 monthly observations (for 
35 consumers we observe 2 months, for 186 – 3 
months, for 318 – 4 months, and for 402 – 5 
months).  
Average monthly Internet usage is equal to 
2,033MB with 1,999MB in January, 2,132 in Febru-
ary, 1,878 in March, 1,986 in April, 1,974 in May and 
2,585 in June (ANOVA shows no significant differ-
ences between months, p=0.579 and no significant 
linear trend in usage p=0.333). On the individual 
consumer level, we observe 677 consumers with no 
significant trend in usage; in the case of 85 consum-
ers, we observe a negative trend in usage; and in 144 
we observe a positive trend in usage (consumers 
with two observation periods were excluded from 
the analysis). 
Out of 941 analyzed consumers, 664 consumers 
always chose the bill-minimizing tariff whereas 277 
consumers at least once in the observation period 
chose a suboptimal tariff (88 consumers who chose 
a suboptimal tariff once, 57 – twice, 58 – three 
times, 41 – four times and 33 – 5 times). In 3,205 
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cases (82% all observations) the cost-minimizing 
tariff was chosen, in 488 cases (12.5% all observa-
tions) the tariff with higher allowance than optimal 
was chosen (flat-rate bias) and in 217 cases (5.5% all 
observations) the tariff with lower allowance than 
optimal was chosen (pay-per-use bias). 
6 Results 
6.1 Measurement of constructs 
The results of the confirmatory factor analysis indi-
cate good overall model fit: ²/df 3.19, root mean 
square error of approximation 0.05, goodness-of-fit 
index 0.99, adjusted goodness-of-fit index 0.98, 
normed-fit index 0.99, Tucker-Lewis index 0.98, 
and confirmatory fit index 0.99. The individual 
factors have coefficient alphas of 0.80 and 0.58, 
construct reliabilities of 0.81 and 0.65, and variance 
extracted estimates of 0.513 and 0.506 for the taxi 
meter and insurance effects, respectively. All meas-
ures for scale reliability exceed critical values. Ex-
cept for two, all item reliabilities exceed 0.4, and all 
t-values for factor loadings exceed 10.0 (p < 0.01). 
All corrected item-to-total correlations are greater 
than 0.40.  
6.2 Segmentation of customers 
As laid out in Section 3, we divide our sample into 
three groups based on survey results: (1) a flat-rate 
preference segment, (2) a flat-rate aversion seg-
ment, and (3) a tariff-indifference segment. 49% of 
consumers have a flat-rate preference, 7% a flat-rate 
aversion, and 43% belong to the tariff-indifferent 
segment. These results are similar to the findings of 
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998). 
6.3 Results of tariff choice model  
Table 3 presents the results of different tariff choice 
models. Model 1 is based on the full sample. Models 
2 and 3 refer to the subset of consumers who par-
ticipated in the survey. Model 3 also accounts for 
tariff-specific preferences. The similar pattern 
across models 1 and 2 confirms that our subset of 
consumers is representative. A comparison of mod-
els 2 and 3 shows that accounting for tariff-specific 
preferences improves model fit. The likelihood ratio 
Table 3: Results from model estimation 
Model 3 







Tariff choice      
Intercept tariff 1 (&11) 1.70*** 2.05*** 2.93*** 4.21*** 1.58*** 
Intercept tariff 2 (&12) 0.64** 1.86*** 0.70 2.90*** 1.61*** 
Billing rate (&2) -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.05*** 
Portfolio choice      
Benefit ( ) 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 
Cost () 0.0002** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
Inclusive value (') 1.10*** 1.19*** 1.03*** 0.98*** 1.42*** 
Log likelihood -138,796.40 -11,423.97   -10,505.07 
Number of Parameters 6 6   18 
Number of Observations 49,023 3,910   3,910 
  287 1,698 1,925 
Segment size 
  7.34% 43.43% 49.23% 
 
***Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, *Significant at 0.10. 
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test shows a significant increase in log likelihood 
when we segment consumers according to their 
tariff-specific preferences and rejects the hypothesis 
of equal response parameters between segments 
(LR = 43,858.07 > 2 95.0;12  = 21.03). Model 3 also 
has greater explanatory power than model 2 (R2 = 
0.21 compared with 0.14).  
 We focus on the results of model 3. As expected, the 
billing rate decreases tariff choice probabilities, an 
effect that is most pronounced for the flat-rate aver-
sion segment (2= -0.16). The results with respect to 
the choice of a usage portfolio are in line with our 
expectations: Benefits from using the Internet in-
crease, whereas opportunity costs decrease the 
probability of choosing a given usage portfolio. The 
coefficients of the inclusive value for the flat-rate 
preference and flat-rate aversion segments are 
greater than 1 (= 1.42 and = 1.03, respectively). 
This result indicates that consumers who like or 
dislike tariff-specific characteristics respond to 
changes in the billing rate more readily by adjusting 
their usage rather than by switching their tariff. By 
contrast, consumers who are indifferent between 
tariffs switch tariffs more easily than usage levels, as 
indicated by a coefficient of the inclusive value be-
low 1 (= 0.98 for tariff-indifference segment). 
These patterns are consistent with our expectations: 
Consumers who prefer a certain type of tariff are 
more likely to keep that tariff and adjust their usage 
than to switch to a different tariff in response to 
price changes. In contrast, consumers with no tariff-
specific preferences find it easier to switch in case of 
a price change. 
 To check the stability of our results, we estimate the 
described models by using another segmentation 
rule. Consumers that score 4 and higher on the taxi 
meter effect and the insurance effect measures are 
assigned to the flat-rate preference segment, those 
who score 2 or lower on both measures are assigned 
to the flat-rate aversion segment, and the remain-
ders are assigned to the indifferent segment. Ac-
cording to this rule, the size of the flat-rate prefer-
ence segment decreases from 49% to 17%, and the 
size of a tariff-indifference segment increases from 
43% to 76%, while the flat-rate aversion segment 
does not change. The results provide a consistent 
pattern for both segmentation rules used (see Ap-
pendix). 
6.4 Price elasticities of tariff choice 
Based on the parameter estimates we compute the 
price elasticities of tariff choice per segment (per-
centage change in choice divided by the percentage 
increase in access or usage price). All elasticities 
have the expected negative sign, but clearly differ by 
segment (see Table 4). Consumers with tariff-
specific preferences tend to be less sensitive to price 
increases of their preferred tariff than other seg-
ments. Specifically, consumers who prefer flat-rate 
tariffs are less sensitive to an increase in the access 
price of the flat rate than consumers with a flat-rate 
aversion (-0.85 versus -1.62). These results imply 
that consumers with a flat-rate preference are less 
Table 4: Price elasticities of tariff choice 
Access price elasticity  
 
Usage price elasticity  




















Tariff 1  
Three-part tariff 
with low access price 
and allowance 
-0.04 -0.09 -0.16 
 
-0.03 -0.08 -0.10 
Tariff 2 
Three-part tariff 
with high access 
price and allowance 
-1.61 -1.00 -0.40 
 
-0.06 -0.05 -0.03 
Tariff 3 Flat rate -1.62 -1.23 -0.85     
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likely to switch down to a three-part tariff in case of 
an increase of the access price of a flat-rate than 
consumers with a flat-rate aversion. Further, con-
sumers with a flat-rate aversion are least sensitive to 
an increase of the access and usage price of tariff 1 
which is the tariff with the lowest allowance (-0.04 
and -0.03 for access and usage price in case of flat-
rate aversion segment compared to -0.16 and -0.10 
for access and usage price in case of flat-rate prefer-
ence segment). These results suggest that flat-rate 
averse consumers who face an increase of the access 
and usage price of a three-part tariff with a low al-
lowance are more likely to stay with this tariff than 
consumers with a flat-rate preference. 
6.5 Price elasticities of usage 
Table 5 shows the price elasticities of usage. The 
differences between segments indicate that tariff-
specific preferences also influence how consumers’ 
usage responds to price increases. An increase of the 
access price of tariff 1 has the greatest positive effect 
on usage in the flat-rate preference segment as these 
consumers are most likely to switch up to a tariff 
with a greater allowance (elasticity in the flat-rate 
preference segment is 0.09, compared to 0.07 in the 
flat-rate aversion segment). Increasing the access 
price of tariff 2 decreases usage among consumers 
with a flat-rate aversion (price elasticity -0.12) that 
are likely to switch down to tariff 1, but increases 
usage among customers with a preference for a flat-
rate tariff (price elasticity 0.08) that have a high 
probability to switch up to a flat rate. Finally, the 
increase in the access price of a flat-rate tariff de-
creases usage in all segments, with the highest effect 
in the flat-rate aversion segment (-0.53 in the flat-
rate aversion segment compared to -0.05 in the flat-
rate preference segment).  
 We turn to the usage price sensitivity. An increase 
in the usage price has a stronger negative effect in 
the flat-rate aversion segment (-0.25 and -0.08) 
than in the flat-rate preference segment (-0.06 and -
0.01). This stronger negative effect in the flat-rate 
aversion segment occurs because this segment is 
less likely to switch up to tariffs with a higher allow-
ance or usage price. These consumers stay on their 
current tariff and decrease their usage. While the 
negative values in the flat-rate preference segment 
are inconsistent with our proposition, the results 
still support our expectation that in the flat-rate 
preference segment the high extent of switching to a 
flat-rate compensates for changes in the usage of 
customers who remain in tariffs 1 and 2. 
7 Conclusions and implications  
Despite recent studies that indicate heterogeneity in 
consumers’ tariff-specific preferences, most re-
search on tariff choice assumes that consumers are 
homogenous in their tariff choice and price sensitiv-
ity. We address this limitation and analyze the ex-
tent of tariff-specific preferences and their influence 
on consumers’ price elasticity of tariff choice and 
usage. 
Table 5: Price elasticities of usage 
Access price elasticity  
 
Usage price elasticity  




















Tariff 1  
Three-part tariff 
with low access price 
and allowance 
0.07 0.08 0.09 
 
-0.25 -0.20 -0.06 
Tariff 2 
Three-part tariff 
with high access 
price and allowance 
-0.12 -0.14 0.08 
 
-0.08 -0.04 -0.01 
Tariff 3 Flat rate -0.53 -0.04 -0.05     
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The results show that accounting for tariff-specific 
preferences when modeling tariff choice signifi-
cantly improves the model fit. Further, we show that 
tariff-specific preferences influence consumers’ 
price sensitivity with respect to both tariff choice 
and usage. Consumer’s tariff choice is less sensitive 
to price increases of their preferred tariff. More 
specifically, consumers with a flat-rate preference 
are relatively insensitive to increases in the access 
and the usage price of tariffs that have a high or 
unlimited usage allowance. By contrast, consumers 
with a flat-rate aversion are relatively insensitive to 
increases in the access and usage prices of tariffs 
with a low usage allowance. Likewise, we find het-
erogeneity in how consumers’ usage responds to 
price changes: Increasing the usage price has a 
strong negative effect on usage in the flat-rate aver-
sion segment and only a moderate negative effect in 
the flat-rate preference segment. The latter segment 
is more likely to switch up to a tariff with a higher 
allowance. On the other hand, increasing the access 
price of a tariff with a low allowance may increase 
usage. This  effect is  greatest in  the flat-rate  prefer- 
 
ence segment. Those consumers are more likely to 
switch up to tariffs with greater allowances where 
they are more likely to face a marginal price of zero. 
Our results show that a company can use prices to 
steer consumers’ tariff choice and thus their usage. 
Likewise, a policy maker may consider price regula-
tion that fosters socially approved behavior. 
Finally, we find that when facing a price increase, 
consumers with tariff-specific preferences are more 
likely to adjust their usage, whereas consumers with 
no tariff-specific preferences more likely adjust their 
tariffs. These results complement existing studies. 
Whereas Iyengar (2005) argues that consumers 
actively try to control their usage costs by either 
switching tariffs or adjusting their consumption 
patterns, other studies report tariff stickiness (Lee 
1999; Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987). Our 
results demonstrate that this heterogeneity in ob-
served switching behavior may be caused by tariff-
specific preferences. 
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Tariff choice    
Intercept tariff 1 (&11) 2.93*** 2.03*** 1.92*** 
Intercept tariff 2 (&12) 0.70 1.82*** 1.34*** 
Billing rate (&2) -0.16*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 
Portfolio choice    
Benefit ( ) 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.27*** 
Cost ( ) 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
Inclusive value (') 1.03*** 1.15*** 1.01*** 
Log likelihood   -10,426.48 
Number of Parameters   18 
Number of Observations   3,910 
287 2,973 650 
Segment size 
7.34% 76.04% 16.62% 
***Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, *Significant at 0.10. 
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